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There have been already some studies on the common traits of the Slovene 
Lacanians (for example, Motoh and Irwin, 2014) – most notably on the work of the 
“troika” composed by Slavoj Žižek, Mladen Dolar and Alenka Zupančič. Their shared 
project of extracting the political and philosophical consequences of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis spans now more than thirty years of work. What has been less 
investigated, however, are the subtle, but relevant distinctions in their diverse 
approaches to this project. In this short review of Zupančič’s latest book, What is Sex? 
(2017), I would like to focus on the singularity of her intellectual trajectory, devoting 
special attention to two interrelated aspects: Zupančič’s decision to situate 
psychoanalysis strictly within the field of sexuality and love and her distinctive 
engagement with Alain Badiou’s philosophy.  
 We will begin by examining an important ambivalence in the concept of “the 
sexual”, most apparent in the very first steps of her research on sexuality, in Why 
Psychoanalysis?, in order to introduce an underlying influence of Badiou’s 
philosophy that not always coincides with her explicit engagement with his project. 
This alternative thread will require us to take a short detour to examine an important 
difference between two forms of relating psychoanalysis and philosophy, one that 
owes more to the Millerian understanding of psychoanalysis, another derived from 
Badiou’s critique of Miller and Lacan. My wager is that it is only by considering the 
challenges posed by Badiou’s theory of the compossibility of generic procedures that 
one can understand some of the crucial contributions of Zupančič to the 
reconstruction of key psychoanalytic ideas, concerning its ontological, ethical and 
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aesthetic dimensions. This will lead us to a brief overview of the theme of tragedy 
and comedy between Ethics of the Real and her more recent works. Finally, we will 
return to the central theme of sexuality, but from an alternative perspective: I would 
like to conclude this review by arguing that even though Zupančič is probably the 
philosopher who took the furthest the theme of the “Two” in psychoanalysis, there is 
still one more step to take in this direction, only implicitly touched upon in her work - 
the one which thinks the “twoness” of psychoanalysis itself, caught up in an 
irreducible tension between the impossible as "cause" and as “consistency". 
 
Where is sex? 
The project of investigating “the very nature and status of sexuality” (2017, 1) was set 
out by Zupančič almost ten years before the publication of What is Sex?, with her 
previous book-length study, Why Psychoanalysis? (2008b). This short book serves as 
an important point of inflection in her intellectual trajectory. Divided into three 
“interventions”, the project not only condensed some of the crucial results of her 
previous investigations - an essay on causation and freedom recuperating themes 
already at play in Ethics of the Real (2000) and The Shortest Shadow (2003), and a 
study on the relation between comedy and the uncanny continuing the brilliant The 
Odd One In (2008a) - but it also sets out, through the opening essay, titled “Sexuality 
and Ontology”, the stakes for What is Sex?. However, more than simply juxtapose 
previous and future research projects, Why Psychoanalysis? helps us to recognize a 
certain asymmetry between the ethical, aesthetic and ontological investigations - a 
certain overdetermination of the first two by the latter. 
 The essay dedicated to the question of sexuality begins with a petition of 
principle: 
 
 “The question of sexuality should indeed be brutally put on the table in any 
 serious attempt at associating philosophy and psychoanalysis. Not only 
 because it usually constitutes the ‘hard core’ of their dissociation, but also 
 because not giving up on the matter of sexuality constitutes the sine qua non 
 of any true psychoanalytic stance, which seems to make this dissociation all 
 more absolute or insurmountable” (Zupančič, 2008b: 6) 
 
 We could surely interpret this claim in line with the more general project of the 
Slovene Lacanians, but I believe that a much more productive reading is possible if 
we focus on the fact that Zupančič is not only joining the ranks to defend the 
concrete universality of psychoanalysis as a “theory and practice that confronts 
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individuals with the most radical dimension of human existence” (Žižek, 2006: 3), but 
rather affirming that sexuality is the operating concept which allows for the transitivity 
between the concrete and the universal within analytical matters. There is a subtle, 
but crucial difference between claiming, like Žižek does, that “neuroses, psychoses 
and perversions have the dignity of fundamental philosophical attitudes towards 
reality” (ibid 4) and affirming that sexuality is the “sine qua non of any true 
psychoanalytic stance”. While the former statement already supposes that the 
universality of psychoanalysis is a matter for philosophy, the latter goes a step 
further, claiming that sexuality is what ties the particularities of analytical thinking to 
its own universality.  
 This might seem like a mere shift in emphasis – and, certainly, these are not 
incompatible claims - but what the above-mentioned passage renders intelligible is 
that the task of “associating” psychoanalysis and philosophy must face an additional 
challenge when we do not simply map these two fields onto the division between 
singularity and universality, but rather accept that psychoanalysis has its own access 
to universality. This challenge affects in a profound way the very delimitation of what 
pertains to the psychoanalytic realm: is philosophy convoked here because there is 
an unthinkable kernel in psychoanalysis - only accessible from an external point of 
view - or is philosophy interested in the analytic field on account of what it thinks? 
We will try to unfold some of the consequences of this distinction as we go along, 
but for now it is enough to that Zupančič’s emphasis on sexuality places it in two 
“spaces” at once: as that which justifies the interest of philosophy in “associating” 
itself with psychoanalysis and as what functions, within psychoanalysis itself, as the 
marker of its own autonomy, the index of its “dissociation” and independence from 
philosophy. The problem with sexuality for philosophy, as Zupančič argues, is not that 
it is “too particular” to be of philosophical interest, as if philosophy was too serious to 
condescend to these “dirty matters” – if anything, philosophy has become 
increasingly obsessed with finding a place within itself for the small and the ordinary, 
very much in line with our “progressive liberalism of morals” (2008b:11). Rather, the 
reason why sexuality is both a necessary and an impossible dimension for 
philosophy to consider when it seeks to establish an articulation with psychoanalysis 
- the cause of their association and dissociation - is that it provides psychoanalysis 
with a different, non-philosophical position from which to think universality: an 
“operator of the inhuman” (ibid 12) that seems to bypass the mediation of the 
concept. 
 This double condition of sexuality in psychoanalysis, the crossing point 
between its singular and universal dimensions, is enriched by another, correlate 
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ambivalence, also mentioned in the early stages of Zupančič’s research. Even though 
“Sexuality and Ontology” goes through a detailed analysis of Freud’s Three Essays on 
Sexuality and important passages of Lacan’s eleventh seminar, the question of the 
ontological import of sexuality begins and ends with the problem of where to 
position oneself within psychoanalysis. This is particularly clear in the concluding 
lines of the essay - which were later recuperated as part of the introduction to What 
is Sex? (2017: 3-4).  
 The greater part of the text is dedicated to introduce the sexual as “the 
concept of a radical ontological impasse” (2008b: 16), demonstrating that “Freud 
discovered human sexuality as a problem (in need of explanation) and not as 
something with which one could eventually explain every (other) problem” (2008b: 7), 
subverting the common idea that psychoanalysis would reach towards generality by 
filling the world with sexual meaning. Instead, Zupančič masterfully argues how, for 
both Freud and Lacan, sexuality is not something which renders our ethical and 
cultural motivations inconsistent, distorting our path towards some hidden 
satisfaction, but something which is itself inherently inconsistent and only “becomes 
what it is” through these mediations which seek to oppose or integrate it into a 
meaningful horizon - in one of her greatest one-liners: sexuality is “a paradox-ridden 
deviation from a norm that does not exist” (ibid).  
 What interests us here, however, is that, after arriving at the sexual as the 
concept of a “fundamental inconsistency of the objective world itself” (ibid: 16), she 
shifts her attention to the related, but irreducible, question of psychoanalysis’ own 
relation to this paradoxical objectivity. This is a telling shift also because it brings into 
play one of the few mentions to Althusser and Marxism in her work: 
 
 “In any social conflict, a ‘neutral’ position is always and necessarily the position 
 of the ruling class: it seems ‘neutral’ because it has achieved the status of the 
 ‘dominant ideology,’ which always strikes us as self-evident. The criterion of 
 objectivity in such a case is thus not neutrality, but the capacity of theory to 
 occupy a singular, specific, point of view within the situation. In this sense, the 
 objectivity is linked here to the very capacity of being ‘partial’ or  ‘partisan.’ As 
 Althusser puts it: when dealing with a conflictual reality (which is the case for 
 both Marxism and psychoanalysis) one cannot see everything from 
 everywhere (on ne peut pas tout voir de par tout); some positions dissimulate 
 this conflict, and some reveal it. One can thus only discover the essence of this 
 conflictual reality by occupying certain positions, and not others, in this very 
 conflict. 
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 What I would like to suggest is that the sexual is precisely such a ‘position’ in 
 psychoanalysis.” (Zupančič 2008b:19) 
 
 There is here a slight change of perspective here, from the analysis of the 
“concept” of the sexual – as the name of an ontological impasse for a subject – to the 
analysis of the sexual as a “position” which unveils a conceptual field – that is, the 
sexual as a site for psychoanalysis. Perhaps we could recuperate here a distinction 
dear to German Idealism (Hegel 1977: 155-173): to say that the sexual is the concept 
of a “conflictual reality” is to think the “objectivity of the subject-object” – to locate the 
indeterminate, inconsistent impasse of subjectivity within material reality – while to 
say that the sexual is “a position within psychoanalysis” is to think the “subjectivity of 
the object-subject” - to think how certain positions allow us to participate in the 
constitution of a space of thinking which both touches and constitutes something of 
the real. The question of the ontological import of sexuality - the problem of the 
“what” of sex – is here transformed into the question of a site, marked by the 
inconsistency at the heart of sexuality, from which the reality of the unconscious is 
thinkable – that is, turned into the problem of the “where” of sex. 
 This shift recuperates the ambivalence at stake in the Zupančič’s introductory 
remarks to “Sexuality and Ontology”, concerning the internal circuit between 
singularity and universality within psychoanalysis, dividing it into the analysis of a 
concept within psychoanalysis and the analysis of the position of psychoanalysis 
within reality. It is my wager that it is only when considering this ambivalence at the 
heart of Zupančič’s treatment of the sexual – both as a concept and as a position – 
that the stakes of What is Sex? can be properly grasped. Were we to locate sexuality 
in psychoanalysis exclusively as the analytical name for an ontological impasse, then 
the universality at stake in psychoanalysis – the ontological import of sexuality 
conceived as ontological – would only be accessible for philosophers, and the 
passage from the singular to the universal would be isomorphous to the moving 
away from psychoanalysis. It is only when sexuality is also understood as a partisan 
position – an engaged stance which one must affirm in order to have access to a 
conflictual totality - that psychoanalysis emerges as a field capable of being the 
address – rather than only the object – of a claim to universality.  
 Even though this passage was reworked and utilized in the first pages of What 
is Sex?, the question of the sexual as the marker of an engagement which 
participates in the consistency of psychoanalysis is not often thematized in her latest 
book, nor in her work in general. However, rather than take this for a sign of its 
marginal status, I want to argue that it points to the underlying tension in her 
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trajectory, an oscillation between treating the universal import of psychoanalysis as 
an object for philosophy and as something which psychoanalysis itself is capable of 
thinking. A tension which is most clearly visible in her recourse to Badiou’s 
philosophy. 
 
Alain Badiou as a condition for psychoanalysis 
 
All of the members of the famous Slovene “troika” are known for their common 
project of extracting the philosophical consequences of psychoanalysis, which is 
then used as a basis for a profound rethinking of the ontological and epistemological 
commitments of Marxist politics, contemporary art, etc. They are also known for 
having recognized in Alain Badiou a “fellow traveler” and, in his work, an important 
interlocutor. Not only was Slavoj Žižek responsible for the introduction of Badiou’s 
work to an English-speaking audience, through long critical essays and a whole 
chapter in his Ticklish Subject (Žižek 1999: 127-170), but both Mladen Dolar and 
Zupančič have also engaged with his work on several accounts, using his ideas both 
as a comparative stance against which to develop their own positions and as the 
example of another philosopher who shares some of their main intellectual and 
political commitments. However, unlike Žižek and Dolar, who concluded their studies 
in psychoanalysis with Jacques-Alain Miller in Paris and gravitated towards Badiou’s 
project later on, Zupančič wrote her doctoral dissertation under his direct supervision 
– a thesis which would later be revised and published as the Ethics of the Real – and 
has not only referred to Badiou as a philosophical and political ally, but as a relevant 
interpreter of Lacan. 
 The trajectory and stakes of Badiou’s engagement with Lacan remain poorly 
documented, and this is certainly not the place to fill this unfortunate lacuna1. It is 
important, however, to note that a common thread running throughout his work - 
from his confrontation with Jacques-Alain Miller, in the Cahiers pour l’Analyse, 
through the discussion of Lacan’s “Logical Time” in Theory of the Subject (2009) all 
the way to Being and Event (2005) - has been the question of the regionalization of 
psychoanalysis, which, I would like to argue, is an innovative way to connect the 
“what” to the “where” of the unconscious. So let us take a quick detour and 
reconstruct the basic tenets of Badiou’s position. 
 Let us consider, for example, how Badiou’s early critique of the concept of 
“suture”, proposed by Miller as the basic operator of Lacan’s logic of the signifier 
(Peden and Hallward ed. 2012: 91-101), did not lead him to reject it, but rather to 
demonstrate that Miller’s (and Lacan’s) mistake was to generalize it beyond the 
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confines of properly psychoanalytic concern: “must we therefore renounce the 
concept of suture? It is, on the contrary, a matter of prescribing its function by 
assigning to it its proper domain” (ibid: 171). What this means is that, under specific 
conditions, proper to the analytic practice and theory, it is consistent to work through 
the vicissitudes of speech as if it was guided exclusively by a discursive principle 
which inversely articulates consistency and desire: within a certain domain, the 
perfect enchainment of statements does in fact imply the disappearance of the real 
as cause, and effectively points to the repression of the impossible kernel of desire. 
The ideological effect of psychoanalysis emerges when, disregarding its own 
regional conditions, it generalizes its conceptual framework to other domains, such 
as pure logic or revolutionary politics. This is not to say that psychoanalysis has 
nothing to add to non-psychoanalytic fields, but that this generalization cannot 
bypass the concern with the partisan position which analysts assume in order to 
constitute a totality structured according to the logic of the signifier.  
 It is this underlying theme - the double imperative to recognize both 
psychoanalysis’ contribution to a general theory of the subject as well as its regional 
status as a theory and practice - that helps us to understand, for instance, his 
supplementation of Lacan’s theory of the real, as proposed in Theory of the Subject. 
There, Badiou argues that the improper generalization of the role of structure in 
psychoanalytic practice has led to a conservative view of politics, espoused by many 
Lacanians: if we simply universalize the Lacanian theory of the “real as cause” – as 
that which only emerges as dispersion and impasse – we lose any capacity to think 
the possibility of durable political constructions which truly affect social structures 
(Badiou 2009: 245-247). But rather than dismissing Lacan’s concept of the real, 
Badiou seeks, once more, to regionalize it, to treat it as one mode in which the real 
can be articulated to the symbolic - as he puts it: “I find no fault with all of this, except 
that I am not swayed by an order of things in which all thought is devoted to the 
inspection of that which subordinates it to the placement of an absence” (ibid: 110).  
In order to do absorb the innovations of the “structural dialectic” without accepting it 
as a general ontological framework, Badiou takes a step back to Hegel’s Science of 
Logic, developing a general theory of variable relations between structure and 
otherness (ibid: 22-28), and then treats the situation in which the real emerges as “the 
absent cause” as a particular case of certain structures, a situation which now does 
not preclude the possibility of other modes of engagement with the real, as when the 
real emerges not as a dispersive force, but as a site for durable invention of a new 
consistency (ibid: 224-233).  
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 A similar strategy of regionalization underlies Badiou’s later work, beginning 
with the magnum opus Being and Event, where it leads to the theory of “generic 
procedures” (Badiou 2005: 16-17). The theory of the truth-procedures brings together 
the critique of improper generalizations - when an otherwise legitimate subjective 
procedure takes itself for the general theory of the subject - and the theory of 
subjective consistency, further developed in Theory of the Subject. The combination 
of these two principles – that there are fields capable of touching on the real of a 
situation, but that this is conditioned by their own partisan engagements – is 
translated here into the affirmation that the circuit between singularity and 
universality takes place immanently within each discipline, and that a philosophical 
apprehension of these non-philosophical claims to universality depend on 
philosophy’s capacity not to “suture” itself to any of these procedures. 
 Let us take the example of politics: for Badiou, politics is a form of thought, 
which requires no recourse to political philosophy in order to establish for itself the 
measure of its inventions and failures, or to criticize its historical deadlocks. 
Philosophy is rather charged with a double task of “thinking the thought” which 
constitutes a political procedure and to do it in such a way that this does not prevent 
there being other forms of thought – art, love and science – nor other forms of 
political thinking still unknown to us. This double injunction is encapsulated in the 
operation of “compossibility” (Badiou, 1999: 61-68), which spells out his novel theory 
of how to articulate philosophy to its non-philosophical conditions. To think in terms 
of compossibility is to both admit the autonomy of a form of thought, the interior 
transit of its theory and practice, of its critical and constructive capacities, as well as 
the existence of other, heterogeneous forms of thinking – which also means that any 
“association” of a non-philosophical procedure to philosophy must respect and 
account for the “dissociation” or independence between this condition and its 
philosophical apprehension.  
 Even though Lacan played such a crucial role in the theoretical construction of 
the generic procedures and the theory of compossibility, the status of psychoanalysis 
in Badiou’s philosophy is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, Badiou defines 
Lacan as an “anti-philosopher” (Badiou 2013) - as a thinker who fused 
psychoanalysis’ existential position with its philosophical consequences – but, on the 
other, he claims that psychoanalysis pertains to the procedure of love – “the only 
thinking of love since Plato” (Badiou 2008: 179). Many commentators have dispelled 
this ambiguity one way or another, either claiming that psychoanalysis as such is an 
anti-philosophy (Clemens 2013), or that Lacan himself was a philosopher (Žižek 
2012: 18). Badiou, however, seems to dwell quite well in this disparity, having no 
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problem to accept a third option, namely, that Lacan as a thinker was incapable of 
accepting the status of psychoanalytic thinking as being part of a regional procedure 
– this is a position which clearly informs, for example, his take on Freud in The 
Century (Badiou 2007: 68-80), his debate with Lacan in Subject and Infinity (Badiou 
2008: 211-227) and his confrontation with Jean-Claude Milner (Badiou 2013). 
 This brief reconstruction of Badiou’s theory of compossibility is important not 
only because it helps us to further systematize the “ambivalence” we have 
recognized in Zupančič’s work on sexuality, but also because it spells out a model of 
articulation that is informed by different commitments than Žižek’s basic strategy of 
how to organize the relations between psychoanalysis and philosophy.  Elsewhere, I 
have highlighted the “borromean structure” of Slavoj Žižek’s theoretical space 
(Tupinambá in Hamza ed. 2015: 159-179) – the way Žižek establishes connections 
between philosophy, politics and psychoanalysis by adhering to a double principle: 
the principle of immanent transition, which states that each field formulates 
problems which are only consistently thinkable from the perspective of other fields of 
thought, and the principle of non-complementarity, which conditions the passage 
between any two of these fields to the mediation of a third. This is precisely the sort 
of formal arrangement between philosophy and psychoanalysis which leads Žižek to 
claim, as I have previously mentioned, that “neuroses, psychoses and perversions 
have the dignity of fundamental philosophical attitudes towards reality” (Žižek 2006: 
4) - this special “dignity” is not thinkable within psychoanalysis, but it becomes 
consistent as an object of thought for philosophy – via the mediation of dialectical 
materialism.  
 To understand the novelty of Žižek’s position, it is essential to recognize that 
his proposal is an alternative solution to the impasses of Miller’s own previous 
solution to the relation between psychoanalysis and politics - the theory of suture, 
which, under the guise of relating these two “discourses of overdetermination” 
(Peden and Hallward, 2012: 80) through a “logic of the origin of logics” (ibid: 92), the 
logic of the signifier, improperly generalized psychoanalysis as the legislator of what 
politics can and cannot think. Instead of articulating psychoanalysis and politics via a 
general logic of discourse, Žižek introduced Hegelian philosophy as a third, equally 
standing field of thought, and de-stratified the articulation of the three fields into a 
space of possible transformations. It was, nevertheless, a solution conceived within 
the basic matrix set out by the Millerian reading of Lacan, given that democratizes 
rather than abolishes the possibility of one of the three fields to serve as the site for 
another’s unthought kernel (Žižek 1989: 11-53).  
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 My hypothesis is that Zupančič’s work has been less interpellated by the 
impasses of the Millerian project than by the challenge of living up to the Badiouian 
conception of psychoanalysis as a condition of philosophy. As we have just seen, it is 
Badiou’s theory of compossibility which requires philosophy to accept (a) that 
psychoanalysis is capable of articulating for itself its own inhuman excess, without 
extrinsic aid, (b) that this capacity does not entail that it thinks inhumanity in general 
and (c) that an association between philosophy and psychoanalysis must respect 
these two conditions. Accordingly, we have shown that Zupančič’s emphasis on the 
role of sexuality in psychoanalysis as both the “concept” of an ontological 
inconsistency and the “position” which allows it to make this inconsistency thinkable 
(a) implies that psychoanalysis has access to the “conflictual reality” it inhabits, (b) 
that its claim to universality, being tied to a previous partisan engagement, does not 
entail a direct political, scientific or artistic pertinence, and (c) requires philosophy to 
not only think what psychoanalysis is – the unthought of its theoretical and practical 
existence – but to think what psychoanalysis thinks - that is, to reconstruct, out of its 
own conceptual fabric, the perspective from which it can be perceived as an 
autonomous procedure. 
 Zupančič’s engagement with Badiou is thus overdetermined by a very 
interesting and somewhat paradoxical tension. On the one hand, the Badiouian 
project authorizes her to preserve the autonomy of psychoanalysis from philosophy, 
as well as from other procedures, in a way that is even more radical than the one we 
find in the works of Žižek and Dolar. But this means explicitly siding with Lacan 
against Badiou’s system, insofar as one must remain within psychoanalytic thinking if 
we are to arrive at its ontological consequences, rather than relying on Badiou’s 
conceptual apparatus. Hence the presupposition, recognizable throughout her work, 
that psychoanalysis concerns above all the procedure of love (Zupančič 2004: 200) - 
while we could say that Žižek privileges its relation to politics, and Dolar its relation to 
art. However, at the same time, Badiou also authorizes us to recognize that Lacan 
himself was incapable of fully preserving this autonomy, sometimes generalizing 
analytic concepts outside of their proper domains in order to guarantee their 
theoretical legibility (for example, through a more or less metaphorical recourse to 
mathematics). But this means that, in order to remain within psychoanalysis’ own 
“conflictual reality”, Zupančič must somehow re-encounter, or reconstruct, the 
paradoxical autonomy of psychoanalysis - as a theory of an ontological impasse and 
as a procedure which departs from this inconsistent site - against Lacan’s own 
ideological commitments.  
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The comedy of impossible consistency 
 
But is psychoanalysis so amenable to a Badiouian treatment - to its consideration as 
a generic procedure or as part of the procedure of love? We have just seen the 
paradoxical status of this question: to merely map Badiou’s concepts onto 
psychoanalytic categories - linking “signifier” to “count-as-one”, “real” to “event”, and 
so on (Žižek 1999; Chiesa 2006) - is not enough, for such a movement does not 
accept that Lacan himself already dabbled in a philosophical generalization of his 
own psychoanalytic theory. Furthermore, it accepts certain conceptual homonymies 
– like in the case of what Lacan and Badiou call “subject” – which obscure rather 
than facilitate this investigation.  What is required, instead, is to find ways to pose 
questions to psychoanalysis which force it to spell out its own procedural quality, its 
own view of what it means to put the real of sexuation to work. 
 One of the ways to extract the tenets of a purely psychoanalytic theory of “real 
consistency” is to investigate the very “grammar” through which it connects and 
organizes the boundaries of its theoretical space. That is to say, the way 
psychoanalysis maps for itself the outer bounds of its theory and practice – a task 
classically associated with aesthetics, insofar as it concerns the way we represent 
that which lacks representation. This is in fact one of the most crucial traits of the 
Slovene Lacanians: an increasingly clear break with the “tragic grammar” of 
psychoanalysis which maps – and restricts – the reach of certain analytical ideas to 
the themes of the mystic, the sublime and the unsayable. But here too Zupančič’s 
critique of the tragic paradigm and her alternative recourse to comedy – and to 
Hegel, for that matter – does not lead us outside of psychoanalysis, or outside of the 
question of love. It rather opens up the possibility for further enriching our 
comprehension of a possible theory of consistency for psychoanalysis itself. 
 In her reading of the great Lubitsch movie Cluny Brown (Novak, Krečič and 
Dolar 2014: 165-180), Zupančič analyzes the famous scene where Cluny comes to the 
train station to say goodbye to Belinski, one of her two love interests, and to tell him 
she has decided to stay behind with Mr. Wilson, in an idealized relationship in which 
her impossible desire has no place. After hearing her long soliloquy explaining her 
decision, Belinski simply tells her to board the train, which she does, without any 
reflection – and they go away together. Commenting on the paradoxical coincidence 
between Cluny’s passive stance towards Belinksi and her courage not to give up on 
her desire, Zupančič compares two approaches to psychoanalysis, distinguished by 
their aesthetic commitments: 
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 “In its tragic paradigm ‘to not give up on your desire’ is a subjective and solitary 
 business. It is an heroic enterprise of fidelity (“to a lost cause”), carried out by a 
 subject in the unbroken continuity of her will and determination. This fidelity 
 manifests itself in the fact that nothing comes close to the lost thing, which 
 functions only as a firm criterion of elimination, leading us to conclude of each 
 and every particular thing that “this is not IT”. In comedy, on the other hand, it is 
 clear that “not to give up on your desire” is something more objective than 
 subjective. It involves an interruption of the subject, her ‘absentness’ triggered 
 precisely by an unexpected emergence of this “IT” (as the impossible object). 
 The same time, and precisely because of this interruption, this discontinuity of 
 the subject, it cannot be a solitary business, something that a subject can carry 
 out all by herself. We could say: to not give up on your desire takes (at least) 
 two. We need a little help with this - from, for instance, someone who helps us 
  
 Here Zupančič proposes a displacement, from the tragic to the comical 
paradigm, turning on the axis of a precise question: how many people it takes not to 
give up on one’s desire? It is not hard to see that this question ties together, in an 
internal circuit, the two sides of the ambivalence we initially traced in “Sexuality and 
Ontology” – it asks: what are the conditions for the sexual as an ontological impasse 
to become a partisan position?  
 The first answer, articulated in a tragic grammar, organizes the conceptual 
categories of psychoanalysis in such a way that the ontological import of the sexual 
interdicts its “militant” aspect: the solitude of one’s confrontation with the impossible 
cause of desire also seals the impossibility of considering psychoanalysis as a 
procedure – given that there is no space in which this impossibility can be inscribed 
without suturing this “heroic enterprise” to some imaginary consistency. The second 
position, which is thoroughly based on the logic of comedy, recognizes that the 
subjective trajectory of an analysis is in fact mediated, through and through, by a 
shared objective partisanship with the analyst2, and therefore is, at least in principle, 
compatible with a Badiouian conception of fidelity as the weaving of a new 
consistency out of the “unexpected emergence” of the impossible.  
 From this perspective, it is in fact possible to reconstruct a useful arc that ties 
together the ethical, aesthetic and ontological lines of research in Zupančič’s work. 
For example, in Zupančič’s detailed engagement with Greek and modern tragedy in 
Ethics of the Real, we already find a critique of the limits of the tragic paradigm for 
the ethics of psychoanalysis. In a comparison between Sophocles’ Antigone and 
Claudel’s Sygne de Coufontaine, she writes: 
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 “As for the ‘ne pas ceder sur son desir', we can say: the 'do not give up on your’ 
 is not simply foreign to what the expression ' to give up on ' implies. Rather, it 
 implies that in order to preserve one thing, one is ready to give up on 
 everything else. In the case of Antigone this implies that she gives (away) 
 everything in order to preserve some final ' having'. In the end, she realizes 
 herself in this final ' having'; she merges with it, she becomes herself the 
 signifier of the desire which runs through her, she incarnates this desire. In the 
 case of Sygne, this goes even further. She does not give up on her desire  
 either, but she finds herself in a situation where this demands that she also 
 gives up on this final ' having', the signifier of her being, and realizes herself in 
 the ' not-having'. In the case of Sygne de Coufontaine, ' not to give up on her 
 desire ' implies precisely that she ' gives away' everything.” (Zupančič 2000: 
 258-259) 
 
 The shift here is not one between tragedy and comedy, but between two sorts 
of tragedy: the Sophoclean paradigm, in which one “gives away everything in order 
to preserve some final ‘having’”, and the Claudelian one, in which “not to give up on 
her desire implies precisely that she gives away everything”. Lacan famously claimed 
that “desire is not articulatable, because it is articulated” (Lacan 2006: 681) – that is, in 
analysis one does not speak “about” one’s desire, it is desire that “speaks” through 
what we say. But what Lacan did not develop, and what emerges in Zupančič’s 
analysis of Sygne’s final act, is the question of the "objective" (or de-subjectified) 
space in which our desire – now subjectively inaccessible – articulates itself, that is, 
“stops not being written”. Where is desire articulating itself when we lose any access 
to its articulation? This is precisely what the tragic paradigm cannot think – and, 
appropriately, it is the place where Ethics of the Real interrupts its investigation. What 
the tragic view of psychoanalysis misses – with its absolutization of the singularity of 
desire, so tempting for us, in that it also assigns philosophy the monopoly of analytic 
universality – is precisely the comprehension of the ambivalence we have been 
tracking thus far: the idea that when we cease to dispose of desire – of a subjective 
access to the inconsistency of being – we can still compose it – write something of 
this impossibility in a consistency that only exists insofar as we participate in it.  
 Even though the “comic turn” remains within the bounds of Freud’s theory of 
the “witz” and Lacan’s own theory of comedy, it is not hard to recognize how the idea 
of that a non-transferential space whose consistency depends on both analyst and 
analysand has no name in Lacanian theory – in fact, the whole point of the theory of 
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the desire of the analyst is to think the removal of any attempt by the analyst to share 
in the consistency of the analysand’s speech. From the standpoint of comedy, 
however, it is possible to recognize that one’s engagement with psychoanalysis – the 
objective partnership between analyst and analysand, beyond all intersubjectivity – is 
the “forced pass” through the very real that psychoanalysis localizes as an impasse3.  
 Let us now skip ahead to What is Sex?, to see how the theory of comedy - 
thoroughly developed in The Odd One In – comes back as an immanently 
psychoanalytic answer to both Lacan’s reliance on the tragic paradigm and to 
Badiou’s theory of the procedures. In the concluding pages of the book, Zupančič 
engages in a confrontation between Lacan’s and Badiou’s projects, comparing their 
different takes on ontology, on the role of the “void” and on the concept of the real. 
The comparison does not stem very far, at this point, from other critical engagements 
by Lacanians with Badiou – specially from Dolar’s and Žižek’s critiques of Badiou, 
which are usually variations on the theme of denouncing Badiou’s incapacity to 
consider the ontological import of the death drive. But after proposing several direct 
conceptual mappings between psychoanalysis and his philosophy, Zupančič 
analyses the concept of event as it appears for Lacan: 
 
 “What, then, would be a Lacanian definition of the Event? An Event occurs 
 when something “stops not being written”, as he puts it in Seminar XX. But 
 how? Not by making the impossible possible, but by performing a disjunction 
 of the necessary and the impossible. (…) What takes place with an Event is 
 thus a disjunction that affirms being in its contingency (rather than in its 
 neutrality). Lacan brings in this definition with respect to the event of love, or 
 rather of the love encounter. The latter can have as a consequence that the 
 sexual relation “stops not being written”. Being no longer slips away, but 
 coincides with the “you” that I love. “You are it!”, “You are the being I’ve always 
 been lacking!” (2017: 134) 
 
 This is a slightly different construction: not a comparison between the 
Lacanian “real" and the Badiouian “event”, but a reconstruction of what Lacan 
himself has to say about events, the way psychoanalysis itself has thought the scene 
of engagement with the impossible. The theory of the encounter is Lacan’s own 
theory of the sexual as a “position”, the Lacanian thinking of how the “ontological 
impasse” that is the lack of sexual relation can “stop not being written” and emerge 
as a site for partisanship and partnership. But it is at this precise moment that 
Zupančič also moves away from the mere defense of Lacan, recognizing his 
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attachment to the tragic paradigm of psychoanalysis, and using comedy to propose 
a different psychoanalytic perspective: 
 
 “After making this point, however, Lacan concludes in a rather pessimistic way 
 beyond the temporal suspension of the non-relation, the love encounter has 
 no means of sustaining this suspension in its contingency, hence it attempts to 
 force its necessity. (..) This is, then, the move from contingency to necessity 
 which ‘constitutes the destiny as well as the drama of love’. It is my (im)modest 
 claim – developed elsewhere - that ‘drama’ is a significant word here, and that 
 the comedy of love, or love as comedy, entails a different logic. But if it is 
 indeed to work, the comedy of love is a much more demanding genre than the 
 tragedy or drama of love. (...) What if we reintroduced here the notion of a ‘new 
 signifier’ as precisely that which could make it possible, in this case, to build 
 something on the basis of a love encounter, without obscuring the 
 contingency of (its) being?” (ibid: 135-136) 
 
 Zupančič’s “(im)modest claim” is, to put it simply, that comedy is the 
psychoanalytic operator of fidelity – it is comedy that gives us the appropriate 
“grammar” to track the objective existence of the impossible when its inscription is 
no longer commensurate with our subjective ‘drama’. Comedy spells out the logic of 
how we participate in the consistency of something which “goes on not giving up in 
our desire” even when we no longer have subjective access to it. However, an 
essential condition for this perspective shift to be possible is for us to include the 
“comedy of love” within the “proper domain” of psychoanalysis – which, in turn, gives 
us new means to evaluate what sort of non-fantasmatic partnership is possible 
between the participants of an analytic setting. Furthermore, rather than 
extrapolating from psychoanalysis onto the sphere of religion or aesthetics, 
Zupančič’s theory of comedy forces the idea of real love (ibid: 137) into 
psychoanalysis, requiring no mediation through politics or any particular 
philosophical project. In fact, she goes as far as claiming that it was Lacan’s extrinsic 
commitments – his “general ‘pessimism’” or “something rooted in his political views” 
(ibid: 135) – that kept this development from emerging within his own thinking.  
 
The idea of love 
 
We are now in a position to return to our initial remarks concerning the ambivalence 
of the sexual in Zupančič’s work with a richer conceptual apparatus. As I have 
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repeatedly claimed, the brief mention to Althusser in “Sexuality and Ontology” and 
again in the beginning of What is Sex? should not be taken for a mere side-note. 
They mark a line of enquiry that insists throughout her trajectory, even if rarely 
thematized as such – an investigation which ties her to the problem of 
psychoanalysis considered as what Badiou calls a “generic procedure”. After all, the 
theory of regionalization, in Mark and Lack, of the real as consistency, in Theory of 
the Subject, and of the compossibility of procedures, after Being and Event, are 
nothing but an increasingly sophisticated elaboration of what Althusser touched 
upon with his idea of “conflictual sciences”. What is rather surprising, however, is to 
realize that, having following this thread all the way through, we end up with two 
views of psychoanalysis, each “refracting” one of the senses of the sexual: a thinking 
which disposes of a concept of the impossible kernel of sexuality and a thinking 
which composes an idea of real love. More than one psychoanalysis, but less than 
two. 
 If we reduce concept of the sexual only to its first facet, we risk hypothesizing 
the singularity of desire, adopting a tragic attitude towards the theory of non-relation 
and treating every form of consistency as imaginary. We also let go of the conceptual 
resources which make the very existence of psychoanalysis as a procedure 
thinkable for psychoanalysis – assigning philosophy the role of keeper of its inner 
consistency. On the other hand, if we accept that the “comedy of love” is thinkable 
within the theoretical space of psychoanalysis, we are not “completing” our 
understanding of Freud and Lacan’s legacy, but rather opening a whole new 
problematic field.  
 As Zupančič summarizes it, “we started with sex (in its “impossibility’) and 
ended with love in its evental dimension” (139). In other words, we began with the 
sexual as “concept of an ontological impasse” or inconsistency, and ended with the 
sexual as an engaged position which gives us access to a consistent treatment of 
this deadlock - that is, the comedy of love. But is this truly the “order of reasons” at 
stake here? Arguing what comes before, the objective fidelity to the idea of love or 
the theory of the sexual qua impossible might seem like a “chicken or egg” scenario, 
but it is far from it: what is at stake is recognizing that psychoanalysis is not only the 
theory which thinks the passage from the sexual to the love event, but a theory which 
is only possible if an event has taken place. After all, are we not following here the 
hypothesis that, were it not for Zupančič’s previous commitment to psychoanalysis as 
a thinking of the love-procedure, her investigation of the ontological import of 
sexuality would probably have remained within the limits of the “tragic” paradigm?  
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 Throughout her many books and essays, Zupančič has insisted on thinking 
through the many expressions of the “irreducible Two” in psychoanalysis: the “two” of 
enjoyment in Ethics of the Real (Zupančič 2000: 249-260), the “two” of the semblance 
in The Shortest Shadow (Zupančič 2003: 150-163 ), the “two” of the phallic signifier in 
The Odd One In (Zupančič 2008:  183-218) and, finally, the “two” of the sexual itself, as 
both the impasse and the point of passage of sexuality, in What is Sex? (128-144). 
What I am trying to suggest in this study is that, underlying this trajectory, there also 
lies the “two” of psychoanalysis as such – both a critical and a constructive 
procedure, even if these two perspectives remain irreducible, and incommensurate, 
with each other. For the first, the event of love is, at best, still to take place, but 
somehow forever out of reach of analytic theory and practice – though its de-
substantialized vision of the sexual as an ontological impasse already presupposes 
an engagement which no objective analysis of reality can account for. For the latter, 
the event of love has already taken place, as the very idea that something can derive 
the consequences of there being a veritable ontological fracture in our constitution 
as sexed beings – but this thematization of fidelity as pertaining to the analytic field 
blurs the difference between the engaged partnership that underlies the clinical 
setting and the one which binds lovers together, losing the specificity of clinical work 
(Zeiher and McGowan, 2017: 55).  
 I believe that this last irreducible “twoness” makes itself legible in Zupančič’s 
remarks on the “capacity of naming” and the role of a “new signifier”, just before the 
concluding pages of What is Sex?. At first, she brings up the question of the “new 
signifier” as a crucial operation within the procedure of love, as that which would be 
“capable of naming, and hence sustaining, the minimal difference (contingency) on 
account of which my lover keeps reminding me of himself” (Zupančič, 2017: 138). 
Countering the “sublime expectations” of what a new signifier might look like within 
the love procedure, she uses the example of intimate nicknames given by lovers to 
each other in a relationship as a use of the signifier which does not work by closing 
the minimal distinction between the love object and the existing object, but rather 
“works at generating and maintaining the space for construction at the precarious 
point of the Event” (ibid). This might be an ordinary example, but it is far from banal 
or unimportant: what is at stake in such nicknames – when they do serve this 
particular function - is precisely the shift from the drama of love to its comedy. From 
the standpoint of the sexual as impasse, signifiers function as a means to represent 
the subject to the Other – hence the “drama” of the che voi?, of finding out what the 
Other wants from me if I have such and such nickname. However, from the 
standpoint of the sexual as the possibility of real love, signifiers function as a means 
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to incorporate the individuals into a love procedure – a loving nickname inscribes us 
not in the Other, but in the very relationship constituted through our adherence to it. 
The difference here lies not in the novelty of the signifier – every signifier is both old 
and new, in a way – but rather on the form of otherness in which it “stops being not 
written”: if it seeks to signify the lack of sexual relation or if it is declared from that 
position4. 
 Zupančič’s last word on the topic, however, does not concern the comic 
interiority of the couple’s intimacy, but rather the more general challenge of finding 
signifiers “that name something about our reality for the first time, and hence make 
this something an object of the world, and of thought” (ibid: 139). This shift, I believe, 
is a good example of the sort of open question which considering psychoanalysis as 
a thinking of real love brings to the fore: what distinguishes, if anything, the role of 
naming in the aftermath of a love-encounter from the act of naming “something 
about our reality for the first time” which constituted the Freudian event to begin 
with? Not the quality of signifiers, but rather the space in which that difference makes 
a difference – a couple is a certain form of partnership built out of the Other’s 
inconsistency, but could we not say that psychoanalysis itself, as a certain 
institutional space, is another? After all, has psychoanalysis – spread across its many 
couches everywhere – not constituted itself an alternative address, a partner which is 
capable of joining us in the inscription of impossible names in the world?  
 The proposal that the “two” of psychoanalysis – its existence oriented by an 
impossible cause and by an impossible consistency – is more than an 
underdeveloped ambivalence in the way sexuality appears in analytic thinking, has 
the strange implication that psychoanalysis, as a clinical practice, might rely more 
than it knows on the organized commitment of both analysts and analysands to the 
forcing of new form of love into existence. It is a strange idea, but it is also quite 
funny. 
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1 Though an important contribution is about to be published, Reza Naderi’s Infinity and the Subject. 
2 There is a fundamental ambiguity, in fact, in Lacan’s own original formulation of this famous 
statement in his seminar on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis: even though it has been taken as a sort of 
general ethical imperative, it was first formulated in the context of a theory of the desire and position of 
the analyst. A study of this ambiguity can be found in my contributions to Hamza (ed.) 2014 and Zeiher 
& McGowan (eds.) 2017.  
3 See Tupinambá 2014: 247-287. 
4 It is my wager, in fact, that a truly novel use of Badiou's project for psychoanalysis should depart not 
from the homonymous category of the subject, but from the further differentiation that the grammar of 
infinity allows us to impose onto the concept of the Other and the object a.  
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